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INTRODUCTION
At the request of EPA Region 9, the National Enforcement
Investigations Center (NEIC) conducted a multimedia compliance investigation
of Puna Geothermal Venture (PGV) - Pahoa, Hawaii. PGV produces
approximately 25 megawatts (MW)- net of electricity using geothermal fluids
(principally steam). The PGV facility occupies approximately 25 acres within
a 500-acre leased property and employs 40 people. PGV is located
approximately 20 miles south of Hilo, Hawaii.
Approximately 800,000 pounds per hour of geothermal fluid are used to
produce the 25 MW net of electrical power sold by PGV. An additional 2.5 MW
of power are produced and consumed in the electrical production process. The
geothermal fluids, including any separated brine and noncondensible gases, are
reinjected back into the ground. Two production wells and three injection
wells are currently in use.
The produced geothermal fluid is separated into a steam phase and
brine phase. A portion of the steam phase is routed directly to a steam turbine
to produce electricity. The steam turbine discharge is combined with the
remaining portion and routed to Ormat Energy Converters (OEC). In the
OECs, geothermal steam is used to vaporize pentane which in turn is used to
drive an organic turbine for additional electrical production. The pentane is
condensed and routed to the OEC to repeat the process. The geothermal steam
exiting the OEC is combined with the noncondensible gases and geothermal
brine before reinjection.
Power production has increased to 30 MW subsequent to the NEIC inspection.
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OBJECTIVE
The specific objectives of the investigation were to determine compliance
with:
• Air pollution control regulations, including state permits
No. P-833-1524 and No. P-834-1582
• Underground Injection Control (UIC) regulations, including state
permit UH-1529
• Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. §11001 ~ ~., EPCRA § 301; and
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9603 CERCLA § 103.
In addition, NEIC personnel identified facility activities/conditions that,
although not specifically regulated, could impact the environment.
INVESTIGATION METHODS
The investigation of PGV included:
"'~.
•
•
•
•
A review of federal and state files
An on-site inspection of the facility conducted February 13
through 17, 1995, which included:
Discussions with facility personnel
Observations and evaluation of facility operations
Review/copy facility records
Sampling of the two groundwater monitoring wells and
geothermal reinjection fluid
Monitoring of 50 potential fugitive emissions points (valves) in
pentane service
2
m
.~ .
~ ".
bz
Personnel from the regional mc program and NEIC worked as a team
to determine compliance with mc requirements.
The technical report has been divided into four main sections: Process
Description - which provides an overview of the geothermal process; and the
Air, Underground Injection Control, and EPCRA sections which discuss
compliance with applicable regulations and permits. These reports form the
basis for the summary of findings presented in the following section.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
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CLEAN AIR ACT
Semiannual sampling and reporting of the
geothermal.resource has not been performed
for all required parameters. No annual or
semiannual resource testing, while operating
under normal conditions, was provided to
HDOH, prior to 1995. After the NEIC
inspection, PGV reported 1994 results
compiled from various test locations. NEIC
determined that ~ of the required 78
parameters were validly reported for well
KS-9, and 37 of 78 for well KS-IO. This did
not inelude the three parameters that PGV
reported were impossible to monitor, or were
redundant with other parameters.
PGV does not have an installed spare
condensate pump. A spare pump is kept in
an adjacent warehouse which does not allow
it to be utilized immediately upon
identification of a malfunction of one of the
three operating pumps.
Areas ofconcern are inspection observations ofpotential problems / activities that could
impact the environment, result in future noncompliance with permit or regulatory
requirements, and / or are areas associated with pollution prevention issues.
The areas of noncompliance and areas of concern· identified during the
investigation are summarized below. These findings are detailed in the
technical report sections.
Areas of Noncompliance
Permit P-833-1524
Attachment II, Condition 20
Permit P-834-1582
Attachment II, Condition 5
~'-~-'-.'
Permit P-834-1582
Attachment II, Condition 10
Permit P-834-1582
Attachment II, Condition 2
Permit P-834-1582
Attachment II, Condition 5
Areas of Concern
Air quality and meteorological data from the
ambient monitoring stations are not
summarized in the monthly reports provided
to HDOH.
Some fugitive emISSIon points are not
monitored on a weekly basis. Potential
fugitive emission points on the fan coolers and
OECs have not been monitored since startup
of the plant.
Pentane transfer records were not included
with the third and fourth 1994 quarterly
reports.
M#¥l4 4W
• Not all National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP) pollutants required to be monitored by the permit are
present in the geothermal fluids. Hawaii Department of Health
(HDOH) should require sampling of only those NESHAP pollutants
which are specifically of interest [PTa P-833-1524, Attachment II,
Condition 20].
• HDOH requires that Best Available Control Technology (BACT) be used
during periods of well equipment failure or malfunction (Permit P-833-
1524 and Permit P-834-1592), but does not define BACT in the permits.
HDOH should also clarify whether or not BACT requirements apply to
well drilling operations. If HDOH intends for those practices described
in the drill plans [which are to be approved by the Hawaii Department
of Land and Natural Resources (HDLNR)] to constitute BACT then this
fact should be made clear in the permit [PTO P-833-1524,
Attachment II, Condition 13].
5
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• Drilling plans prepared after the 1991 KS-8 well incident do not address
all recommendations made In independent investigations, or
investigations by PGV, subsequent to that incident. These include
provisions for adequate kill fluid temperatures and quantities,
maximum-sized mud pump liners, and weight criteria. Also there is no
apparent written requirement in the drill plan for the addition of lime
to the recirculating wellbore fluids. HDOH should review
recommendations made in the 1991 investigation, and PGY's response
to those recommendations, as well as drill mud lime requirements to
ensure that all necessary precautions are being taken.
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• The Emergency Steam Relief Facility (ESRF) design, modifications, and
consultant recommendations, and PGY's response to these
• The permit limitation of fugitive hydrogen sulfide emissions to less than
1 lblhr is unmeasurable and, therefore, unenforceable. An option to
addressing fugitive hydrogen sulfide emissions is to impose additional
requirements on PGY's existing in-plant hydrogen sulfide monitoring
system. These requirements could address minimum allowable monitor
downtime, monitor calibration and identification of plant areas or
equipment where repetitive leaks occur [PrO P-834-1524,
Attachment II, Condition 20].
There are limited means to verify compliance with the plant-wide 200
pounds per day pentane emission limit. Pentane inventory levels are
reconciled only on a quarterly basis and, therefore, daily exceedances
can only be confirmed if the total emissions for the quarter exceed
18,000 pounds (90 days per quarter x 200 pounds per day), or if there
is a report of a catastrophic release [PrO P-834-1524, Attachment II,
Condition 3].
•
recommendations and the related NEIC evaluation, should be reviewed
to ensure that the 1992 ESRF problems have been adequately
addressed. NEIC's evaluation indicates that there are still potential
C'
problems. ,~c /d I N ci
Explanations for large pentane transfers should be included on the
quarterly air reports. This information would provide operational
history of the individual OECs and could be useful in scheduling
preventative maintenance activities, such as increased frequency
monitoring for OEC requiring frequent pentane transfers [PTO P-834-
1524, Attachment II, Condition 5].
L' '.. ,", - L'/4 r'
The noncondensible gas vent from the Vapor Recovery Unit (VRU)
should be included in the volatile organic compounds (VOC) monitoring
program. Monitoring readings may demonstrate that this vent stack is
a significant source for pentane losses.
•
•
• The number of components identified by NEIC to be leaking, at levels
above background, is greater than that identified by PGV monitoring.
• Fugitive pentane monitoring at a distance of2 inches, as required by the
permit, is not appropriate. The facility has not identified any leaking
components since the program was initiated. NEIC identified four
components leaking at greater than 1,000 ppm when measured at the
interface; however, when the monitoring distance was increased to 2
inches, the readings dropped below the 1,000 ppm limit specified in the
permit. The EPA approved fugitive monitoring method, Method 21
Appendix A of CFR 40 Part 60, requires that fugitive monitoring be
conducted at the component interface [PTO P-834-1524, Attachment II,
Condition 2].
7
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NEIC identified seven components leaking at greater than 100 ppm of
which four were leaking at greater than 1,000 ppm when monitoring at
the component interface. Previous monitoring at the component
interface, in the same area, by PGV personnel identified only one
leaking component at a concentration of 100 ppm. Due to the slower
response time of the PGV monitoring equipment, PGV operators will
need to be more deliberate while monitoring potential fugitive emission
sources.
~c~t-fD~i+
• The fugitive monitoring calibration gas used byl PGV did not display a
manufacture or expiration date. The approved fugitive monitoring
method, Method 21 Appendix A of eFR 40 Part 60, requires that
calibration gases display a manufacture date.
• Hydrogen sulfide and meteorological monitoring data should be
reviewed, evaluated, and summarized on the required reports.
Currently, all the monitoring data is supplied without summary or
reporting of upset conditions. Combining HDOH and PGV,monitoring
data into a single program would allow for a comprehensive evaluation
of all available data.
• The online time for the three PGV-operated ambient air monitors is only
86% for the last 6 months. The west air monitor was the least reliable
and was only operational for 64% of the time. The PGV should purchase
a spare H2S analyzer to eliminate equipment downtime gaps which have
occurred in the past monitoring periods.
• PGV should stagger the calibration period for the H2S analyzers so that
at least two analyzers are in operation at all times.
8
Suggested Permit Changes·
• The permit should clearly specify the chemicals analyses to be conducted
on the geothermal resource. The permit requires analyses for the
NESHAP pollutants. However, it is unclear as to whether this reference
refers to a specific NESHAP chemical, all NESHAP chemicals (40 CFR
Part 61), or all Hazardous Air Pollutants (40 CFR Part 63) [PTO P-833-
1524, Attachment II, Condition 20].
• The specific controls and/or equipment needed to comply with Best
Available Control Technology (BACT) should be specified. The current
permit does not define BACT; is unclear as to whether BACT applies
only to well drilling malfunctions or during all well drilling activities;
and does not specify who is responsible for approving BACT provisions
[PTO P-833-1524, Attachment II, Condition 13].
• The permit limitation of 1 lblhr of H2S emissions is unmeasurable and"
therefore unenforceable. There is no requirement for PGV to monitor
or otherwise calculate the actual release ofH2S during normal operating
conditions. This permit condition should be removed, modified, or
perhaps replaced by imposing additional monitoring requirements using
PGV's existing in-plant H2S monitoring system [PTO P-834-1524,
Attachment II, Condition 20].
• Allowing the measurement of fugitive emISSIOns points at a 2-inch
distance is inconsistent with procedures required in the Method 21
Appendix A of CFR 40 Part 60. Monitoring should be conducted at the
component interface as required in Method 21. Ifmonitoring of all VOC
These issues are also discussed under "Areas of Concern. "
9
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components is conducted according to Method 21 Appendix A ofCFR 40
Part 60, then less frequent monitoring could be considered. Monthly
sampling rather weekly sampling should be considered if monitoring is
conducted at the interface. Monthly or quarterly monitoring frequencies
are required in the New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) and
National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP)
regulations [PTO P-834-1524, Attachment II, Condition 2].
• The 200 lb/day pentane emission limit cannot be verified with existing
permit recordkeeping requirements. Either the daily inventory in the
pentane storage tanks or the daily quantity ofpentane transferred from
the VRU to the pentane storage tanks must be recorded into order to
calculate the daily emissions [PTO P-834-1524, Attachment II,
Conditions 3 and 5].
• The noncondensible gas vent from the VRU should be ineluded in the
pentane monitoring system. Based on the low PGV reported leak rates
and lack of any reported pentane upset/releases, the VRU vent is a
likely source of pentane emissions [PTO P-834-1524, Attachment II,
Condition 2] .
• An explanation for pentane transfers should be required in the quarterly
reports. This information would provide operational history of the
individual OECs and be useful in scheduling preventive maintenance
activities [PTO P-834-1524, Attachment II, Condition 5].
• Several data reporting changes should be considered to improve the
usefulness of the ambient air monitoring summary.
10
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Historical data summaries should be included for each hydrogen
sulfide analyzer to show dates, durations, and likely causes of
past hydrogen sulfide readings.
Historical data should be included for each hydrogen sulfide
analyzer to show availability and online time percentages.
Additionally, information regarding daily exceedances should be
included with the summary.
PGV ambient air monitoring data should be submitted more
frequently. Availability of the PGV data should be consistent
with that of the HDOH data.
Ambient air and meteorological data from the HDOH monitoring
stations should be included.
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UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL
Areas of Noncompliance
Permit UH-1529
Part IA.3(a)
Permit UH-1529
Part I B. 1. (0
Permit UH-1529
Part III A. 1 (a)
Permit UH-1529
Part III A. 1. (b)
Injection rate exceeded 675,000 pounds for 10
days during September 1994. Notification
was provided within 1 week to HDOH for five
of the daily exceedances.
PGV does not monitor for all parameters
identified in the permit. Instead of reporting
m- and p-cresol as individual compounds as
required under type II sampling in the
permit, the company reported combined m-
and p-cresol. Additionally, for Type III
sampling, the following chemicals were not
reported.
• 2-Chloroethylvinyl ether
• Dibromochloromethane
• 1,1-Dichloroethane
• 1,2-Dichloropropane
• 1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane
• 1,1,I-Trichloroethane
• 1,1,2-Trichloroethane
PGV did not follow the Standard Operating
Procedures for Monitoring Well Sampling as
referenced in the "Hydrologic Monitoring
Program." There was no purging of MW-1.
The procedures call for sampled wells to be
purged of 3 to 10 times its borehole volume of
standing water.
PGV did not follow the procedures specified in
the "Production and Reinjection Well Casing
Monitoring Program." Redacted due to
Confidential Business Information.
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Areas of Concern
• The calculation procedures used to report the hourly injectate rates may
not accurately reflect the true hourly injectate rates. PGV calculates,
and subsequently reports, the average hourly flow rate by dividing the
daily total mass quantity by 24 hours. This calculation procedure
results in the reporting of the average hourly flow rate as opposed to the
actual hourly flow rate.
• PGV should consider including a narrative description for "large"
annulus pressure changes in the Quarterly Injection Well Status
Reports. Additionally, the company should develop estimates as to the
acceptable pressure drops or pressure drop rates. Specifically the
company should specify what pressure drop would indicate a loss of
mechanical integrity during normal operations.
• The existing injectate cooling equipment does not provide sufficient
cooling to maximize retention of volatile components in the sample.
Injectate samples should be further cooled prior to collection. The
collection sample temperature should also be recorded.
• PGV has not analyzed for all parameters specified in the permit and the
state has apparently not requested this missing information. Several
required chemical constituents (e.g., helium) could likely be dropped
from the permit, or reduced in sampling frequency, without impacting
the effectiveness of the permit. Additionally, the permit should be
modified to reflect analyses for constituents in the aqueous form rather
than the gaseous form (e.g., chloride rather than chlorine). PGV and the
state should consider modifying the mc permit to include appropriate
chemicals for analyses.
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• PGV should document the basis for their assumptions of flows entering
the ESRF collection pond. This information could then be used to
determine if the ESRF collection pond is sized appropriately.
• The costs for plugging more than one relatively deep geothermal well
could be high. There is the need to assess if the current bond for
plugging and abandoning is insufficient. If additional wells are drilled,
the bond for plugging and abandoning should be increased.
EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO-KNOW ACT
Areas of Concern
• The assumptions and calculations used to estimate the quantity of HzS
released (or other reportable materials) should be included with the
incident reports. Retention of this documentation at a central location
within the plant will facilitate emergency prevention, preparedness, and
planning as well as easier review for future incidents (if any).
• A preliminary review of the draft Emergency Response Plan (version
6.2) identified several deficiencies which should be addressed. Some of
these deficiencies were also pointed out in the review of the previous
version by Region 9. Generally, the plan does not provide specific
information. Several terms or phrases should be defined or clarified to
avoid confusion or misunderstandings if an incident occurred. The
deficiencies in the draft version are identified in the ERP section of this
report.
14
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PROCESS DESCRIPTION
The PGV geothermal plant produces 25 megawatts- net of electricity
using geothermal fluids. The geothermal fluid is separated into liquid (brine)
and vapor (steam) phases. The brine is routed directly to the reinjection wells
and a portion of the steam is routed to a steam turbine to produce electricity.
The unused steam portion is combined with the spent steam exiting the
turbine, and is routed to 1 of 10 Ormat Energy Conversion (OEC) units.
Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Infonnation.
The following process discussion has been divided into three sections:
Geothermal Production Wells, Power Plant, and Reinjection Wells. A plot plan
of the facility is provided in Figure 1, and a simplified process flow diagram is
provided in Figure 2.
Power production has increased to 30 MW subsequent to the NEIC inspection.
15
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Figure 1
PLOT PLAN
Puna Geothermal Venture
Pahoa Hawaii 5 +~+;-' e ("\A
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Figure 2 • Process Flow Diagram . Redacted due to Confidential
Business Information
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GEOTHERMAL PRODUCTION WELLS
Two production wells, KS-9 and KS-I0, provide all the geothermal fluid
needed to operate the plant. Each well produces a two-phase flow consisting
of steam and brine. Only the steam phase is used for electrical production.
Operating characteristics of the production wells, as provided during the
February 1995 inspection, are summarized below.
Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Information.
Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Information.
From the control loops, the geothermal fluid flows through a flash
separator [photograph 1]" where the steam and brine are separated. During
normal operation, the combined steam flow from KS-9 and KS-I0 flash
separators are routed through a common header to the power plant. Brine is
All photographs are found in Appendix A.
18
routed to the reinjection wells. Redacted due to Confidential Business
Information.
Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Information.
The caustic system consists of two caustic (sodium hydroxide) storage
tanks and three caustic delivery pumps. The first tank stores strong caustic
(50%) used to make the dilute caustic (15%) stored in the second tank. The
concentrated caustic pump is used to transfer 50% caustic to the dilute caustic
tank. The two dilute caustic pumps inject the dilute caustic solution into the
pipeline leading to the rock mufflers.
Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Information.
Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Information.
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A history for wells drilled at PGV is summarized in Appendix B. Wells
are used either for steam production, as described above, or for reinjection
discussed later in this section. The actual well usage might not be determined
until well drilling and developing steps are completed. Some wells (e.g., KS-7
and KS-B) could not be used for their intended purpose due to geothermal
controllability problems.
POWER PLANT
Power is produced through 10 equally-sized electrical power generators.
Each generator is connected through reducing gears to two turbines, the steam
turbine and the organic turbine. Geothermal steam is used directly to power
the steam turbine and pressurized pentane vapor is used to power the organic
turbine.
Steam flow from the common header is divided into separate lines
leading to the 10 generators. A portion of the steam is directed through the
steam turbine. The steam exiting the turbine is recombined with the bypassed
portion and is routed to the OEC unit [Figure 2].
The OEC unit is a closed loop system using pressurized pentane vapors
to power the organic turbine. 6 lines redacted due to Confidential Business
Infonnation.
20
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Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Infonnation.
Noncondensible gases (primarily HzS and CO2) removed from the 10
pentane vaporizers are collected and cooled before entering the first
compressor. The CBI compressors are operated in parallel, with each
having the capacity to compress the total noncondensible gas flow. Condensate
removed prior to the first stage and between the first and second stages is
combined with the geothermal steam condensate from the OECs.
Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Infonnation.
21
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A small quantity of inert gas accumulates in the OEe recirculating
pentane system and must be periodically vented. The vapor, containing mostly
pentane and nitrogen, is vented from the pentane accumulators to the Vapor
Recovery Unit (VRU). The VRU uses refrigeration to condense the pentane
and water form the vapor. The nitrogen and any other inert gas is released
to the atmosphere. The hydrocarbon is returned to one of two pentane storage
tanks. Pentane is periodically withdrawn from these tanks for makeup to the
OECs.
GEOTHERMAL REINJECTION WELLS
The geothermal brine separated at the production wells, geothermal
steam condensate collected from the 10 OECs and compressor knockout pots,
and noncondensible gases are all recombined prior to reinjection. A corrosion
inhibitor is added into this stream prior to underground injection in order to
minimize corrosion in the injection wells.
The OEC steam condensate and the compressors condensate are
combined, mixed with a corrosion inhibitor, and routed to one of three
condensate reinjection pumps. Typically all three pumps are in operation.
These pumps boost the pressure of the combined stream to avoid flashing when
combined with the brine separated at the production wellheads.
The condensate reinjection pump flow passes through a pressure control
valve and a mixing spool where the compressor discharge gases are added. A
pipeline carries the recombined geothermal fluid to the reinjection area. At the
reinjection area the flow is split with a portion routed to each reinjection well:
KS-1A, KS-3, and KS-4. Each well is equipped with flow and pressure
measurement for balancing well operations. The quality and quantity of fluids
22
injected through the reinjection wells is regulated by me permit UH-1529 and
is discussed in the me portion of this report.
23
CLEAN AIR ACT
Discussions of air compliance issues have been divided into three
sections: Wellfield, which includes productions wells, reinjection wells, and
drilling activities; Power Plant, which includes those fugitive and point sources
associated with power production; and Ambient Air Monitoring, which includes
air quality and meteorological off-site monitoring.
WELLFIELD EMISSIONS
Wellfield emissions primarily occur during nonroutine conditions such
as well drilling, flow testing, and abated well cleanout. Wellfield emissions can
also occur from leaks in flanges, connections, valves, or fittings. When
completed wells are not experiencing any equipment failure or malfunction,
there are no wellfield emissions. At the time of the NEIC investigation, all five
active wells were in normal operation.
Table 1 summarizes well blowout and geothermal release incidents
which have occurred at PGV [Appendix C]: The table shows ambient HzS
concentrations resulting from those incidents (when such data were available
from PGV incident reports). Three incidents have resulted in exceedances of
permit limits for ambient hydrogen sulfide concentrations. These were a result
of a well blowout at KS-8 and flange leaks at KS-3 and KS-8.
Permit No. P-833-1524 [Appendix DJ, issued by the HDOH on July 26,
1993, regulates the wellfield operations for the five geothermal wells currently
Many of the readings in the PGV incident reports [Appendix Cl were difficult to
understand, and should be made more legible in future iru;ident reports.
24
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in service. It is effective until July 1, 1995: and specifies emission control,
monitoring, and reporting requirements. Permit No. NSP 0008-01-N
[Appendix El provides similar limits for the construction of up to 14
exploratory/developmental wells which could be installed in the future. This
permit was issued on June 22, 1994 and is effective until June 1, 1999. Mr.
Lynn White, PGV General Manager, stated during the inspection that there
is no current intent by PGV to drill additional wells, but circumstances, such
as failure of an existing well, might necessitate installing additional wells.
During the NEIC investigation, the following wellfield air pollution
issues were identified.
• BACT requirements for geothermal well emissions
• Required periodic geothermal resource sampling
• Special geothermal resource sample requirements
BACT for Geothermal Well Emissions
HDOH reqUIres that Best Available Control Technology (BACT) be
applied to H2S emissions during geothermal well flow testing operations and
periods ofwell equipment failure (special condition 13, Attachment II ofpermit
PTO P-833-1524). However, the permit does not define BACT.
Hawaii regulation 11-60.1-1 defines BACT to be an emission limitation,
which the director ofHDOH determines is achievable based upon a number of
factors including economics and environmental impact [Appendix Fl. The
regulation allows for use of technology requirements, or work practice
PGV has applied for renewal of the permit. HDOH has not reissued the permit,
however in accordance with Hawaii air regulations, the existing permit remains valid.
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standards if an emissions standard is infeasible. The permit does not include
an emission limitation, or any of the prescribed alternatives to an emission
limitation, when it refers to BACT·.
It is also not clear if the BACT requirement applies to drilling activities
(General requirement B.B of Attachment II, NCF No. OOOB-OI-N states that
during well blowouts, the permittee shall "immediately proceed with measures
to kill or gain control of the well"). Bob Verity, PGV consultant, stated that
BACT is defined prior to each well operation in the plan provided to HDLNR
pursuant to HDLNR notification requirements. The HDOH permit does not
state that HDLNR is responsible for approving BACT provisions. The HDOH
permit should be revised to include specific BACT provisions based on Hawaii
regulation 11-60.1-1.
Subsequent to the blowout ofwell KS-8 in June 1991, a third-party team
consisting offour investigators experienced in geothermal drilling and resource
issues, evaluated the adequacy of PGV's drilling and blowout prevention
equipment (BOPE) and procedures. In their report [Appendix GJ, they
determined that the blowout and subsequent release of hydrogen sulfide
occurred because of shortcomings in the PGV program and not as the result of
unusual or unmanageable subsurface geologic or hydrologic conditions. Their
recommendations included a number of equipment and procedural changes
which could be used to provide a basis for defining BACT for drilling activities
at rov (their recommendations, however, are not currently required by HDOH
as BACT). On the other hand, the investigation report cautioned against
agencies being too specific in specifying BOPE and casing requirements, and
recommended that the operator be permitted to make judgement calls to
modify the drilling operation.
This is not the same definition ofBACT cu under the Federal regulations.
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PGV has drilled two wells, KS-9 and KS-10, subsequent to the KS-8
incident. Neither well activity resulted in emissions that exceeded the ambient
permit limits of 10 ppb daily or 25 ppb hourly (see discussion below regarding
ambient monitoring). There was a release of hydrogen sulfide resulting in a
23-ppb ambient hourly H2S concentration during the abated cleanout of well
KS-9 due to inadequate caustic scrubbing of noncondensible gas prior to its
release from the cyclonic muffler. PGV has since modified caustic introduction
to prevent future occurrences of this nature.
Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Information.
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Table 2
KS-9 DRILLING PLAN REVIEW
Puna Geothermal Venture
Pahoa, Hawaii
1991 Investigation Rerommendations PGV 1992 Drilling Plan for KS·9
Control of Geothermal Kicks
• Provide large supply of cold or cool water Redacted due to Confidential Business
«75 OF). Information.
• Provide a pump system with adequate
capacity to kill a kick in a large well.
Blow Out Prevention Equipment
• Allow for adequate mud cooler capability;
larger than used on KS-8.
• Ensure that pit level indicators and other
monitoring readouts are located for ready
observation by well driller. Redacted due to Confidential Business
• Provide a low pressure burst plate on relief Information.
line.
• Provide an adequate diameter choke line (4").
• Ensure that mud pumps have maximum
sized pump liners.
• Ensure that silencer/mufller is installed on
end of choke manifold line.
Drillim~ Below 500' without BOPE
• Take maximum bottom hole temperatures at
every connection. Redacted due to Confidential Business
• Collect and quickly conduct conductivityl Information.
salinity analyses of water samples.
• Collect.cutting samples every 10' and analyze
for geothermal minerals.
Driller SupervisiontrrainiDi
• Supervisory personnel should be present on
rig floor during all drilling. Redacted due to Confidential Business
Information.
• Tool pushers. drillers. and derrick men
should be trained in use of monitoring
equipment.
29
PGV responded to the recommendations made by the investigation team
in a September 5, 1991 report [Appendix I]. In general, they did not agree
that any of the suggestions provided by the team would have prevented the
release that occurred at KS-8. They instead outlined subsequent PGV drilling
program changes, which included only some of the recommendations of the
investigation team. Their changes addressed actions for each of the following
areas: drill casing, mud weight, supervision, training, monitoring equipment,
water supply, mud system, BOPE system and wellhead design. It is not clear
how drilling ofwells KS-9 and KS-10 incorporated these changes. Some of the
guidelines were vague and not clearly defined (e.g., the casing setting criteria,
how mineralization of drill cuttings would be used in conjunction with other
"criteria," and how mud weight requirements would change with depth). Other
guidelines were less vague but were not specified or referenced in subsequent
drilling plans (e.g., the 425 of temperature readings for determining the top
of the formation, the chain of responsibility for determining actions, and
drilling monitoring alarm levels). In summary, although PGV stated that the
actions they provided for in their September 5, 1991 report would more
satisfactorily prevent incidents similar to KS-8 from occurring, there is a lack
of documentation to show to what degree these actions were implemented in
subsequent drilling at the site.
There is no reconciliation between the KS-8 1991 drill program changes,
or subsequent drilling plans for KS-9. Consequently, NEIC was unable to
evaluate PGV's modifications to drilling practices. The 1991 recommendation
that the state of Hawaii work toward establishing drilling equipment and
procedures standards has not been completed. These standards would have
been helpful in this evaluation. Although the development of such standards
would be likely hindered by state budget limitations, it is appropriate that
HDOH and PGV develop a cost estimate and schedule for doing this work, and
solicit assistance from appropriate industry groups to aid in this effort.
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Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Information.
Required Periodic Geothennal Resource Sampling
Geothermal resource sampling is required by special condition 20 in PrO
P-833-1524. Geothermal condensate, steam, particulates, and gases from each
production well must be tested annually for the chemical constituents specified
in special condition 20. If there is more than a +/- 10% change in the hydrogen
sulfide concentration of the fluid from a well, then the well must be tested
semi-annually and results submitted to HDOH.
PGV stated that much of the analytical data required for the geothermal
fluid is collected monthly, but has not been submitted to the HDOH in a
semiannual or annual format. NEIC reviewed PGV monthly sampling
[Appendix J] results. Table 3 shows reported brine and vapor hydrogen sulfide
concentrations. There has been more than a +/- 10% change in the hydrogen
sulfide concentration. For example, hydrogen sulfide vapor concentration at
KS-10 has increased from approximately 300 ppm to greater than 500 ppm.
The analytical parameters required by condition 20 ofPI'O P-833-1524,
and those parameters analyzed monthly by PGV in data made available at the
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Table 3
HYDROGEN SULFIDE CONCENTRATION (PPM)
Puna Geothermal Venture
Pahoa, Hawaii
Well KS-9 Well KS-10
MonthlYear Brine Vapor Brine Vapor
12/93 8.15 4.84
01194 11.7 6.89
02/94 834 5.75 322
03/94 7.81 816 2.96 298
04/94 7.94 831 5.17 589
05/94 7.38 817 4.82 515 ~~
06/94 6.80 845 4.14
./L----560
07/94 8.62 /
08/94 539
09/94 7.84 821 3.24
10/94 7.39 701 2.95
11194 742
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vtime of the NEIC inspection, are shown in Table 4. Concentration limits are
not set for any of the identified parameters; however, a monitoring schedule
is established. Based on the data made available during the inspection, PGV
analyzed 11 of the 20 required brine parameters, and 5 of the 11 required gas
phase parameters for each well. Of the parameters required for monitoring in
special condition 20, there is a requir"'ment to monitor "NESHAP pollutants,"
some of which are also specified individually (e.g., mercury, benzene, etc.) in
the permit. It is not clear whether the NESHAP list includes only original
NESHAP predating the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments (40 CFR 61.01), or
the hazardous air pollutant list promulgated pursuant as 42 USC 7412; Clean
Air Act, Title I, Part A, Section 112 (as amended, 1990). It is recommended
that HDOH re-examine the NESHAP requirement and specify individual
NESHAP parameters likely to occur in geothermal resources, which should be
monitored. At the time of the inspection, PGV had not reported results of any
routine annual or semiannual resource sample analysis.
After the NEIC inspection, PGV summarized monitoring results and
submitted them on June 29,1995 to the HDOH [Appendix KJ. The submittal
included data which had not been reviewed or copied by NEIC during the
inspection. These data were reported by PGV to be from "mixed" sources (i.e.,
some directly from the wells, and other from the "process" after the steam from
each well was combined). Data from downstream "process" monitoring points
do not meet the requirement of special condition 20. Although there were
some apparent discrepancies in the summary sheets, NEIC was not able to
review the supporting data in order to evaluate those discrepancies. Based on
PGV's summary information for 1994, PGV analyzed 15 of the required 78
parameters at KS-9, and 37 of the required 78 parameters at KS-10. (This
assumes, as stated by PGV, that total sulfur, HCI, and sulfur dioxide are either
impossible to measure, or are redundant and, therefore, unnecessary.) No
resource data for operations during 1993, or before, were provided.
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Analyses Required by Permit
PTa P-833-1524
Semiannual/Annual and Abated Well Monthly Analyses by PGV Abated Well Cleanout*
Cleanout for 1993/94 Analyses by PGV in 1993
Steam Condensateflotal Steamtrotal Brine B.rim :6.riM
Benzene Benzene
Ammonia (total)
Arsenic
Lead
Cadmium
Bicarbonate and carbonate Total alkalinity Total alkalinity
Sulfates Sulfates Sulfates
Chlorides Chlorides Chlorides
Nitrates
Boron (total) Boron Boron
Hydrogen Sulfide (total) Hydrogen sulfide Hydrogen sulfide
Fluorides (total) Fluorides Fluoride
Total sulfur
Mercury (total)
pH pH pH
Total dissolved solids Total dissolved solids Total dissolved solids
Total suspended solids Total suspended solids Total suspended solids
Percent noncondensibiles Percent noncondensibiles Percent noncondensibiles
Hydrogen Chloride
Other NESHAPs pollutants
Gas Phase ~ Yalliu:
Benzene Benzene Benzene
Hydrogen sulfide Hydrogen sulfide Hydrogen sulfide
Ammonia ," Ammonia Ammonia
Radon 222 and daughters
Mercury vapor
Methane Methane Methane
Nonmethane hydrocarbons Nonmethane hydrocarbons
Carbon dioxide
Sulfur dioxide
Hydrogen chloride
Other NESHAPs GClMS scan provided
~;..
•
Table 4
ANALYSES OF GEOTHERMAL FLUID PARAMETERS
REVEIWED DURING NEIC INSPECTION
Puna Geothermal Venture
Pahoa, Hawaii
Flow testing and abated well cleanout were conducted for wells KS-9 and KS·lO in 1993.
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vSpecial Geothermal Resource Sample Requirements
During well drilling, abated well cleanout, and flow testing, PGV is
required by special condition 20 of the permit to test for the same chemical
constituents discussed in the section above.
NEIC reviewed test results provided for the abated well cleanout ofwells
KS-9 and KS-IO performed in 1993. Table 4 shows analyses required in
special condition 20 of the permit and the analyses conducted by roV. PGV
analyzed 11 of the 20 required condensate parameters and 5 of the 11 vapor
parameters. Mr. Paul Hirtz, PGV consultant, stated that although other
specified constituents are not individually indicated in the reports, the HDOH
was provided a copy of the GCIMS strip charts along with the report. Also, in
accordance with special condition 29 of Attachment IT, PrO P-833-1524
effective in 1993, the HDOH required, and was provided with, a test plan for
all tests that were conducted in conjunction with those activities.
Consequently, HDOH had the opportunity to disapprove the proposed analysis
if the Agency did not feel the plan met the permit requirements. In their June
1995 submittal to HDOH after the NEIC inspection, PGV reported values for
37 of the 39 required parameters for KS-9, and 37 of39 parameters for KS-I0.
(Again, this assumes HCI, S02, and total sulfur are either impossible to
measure, or can be calculated from other data.)
POWER PLANT EMISSIONS
The primary emissions from the power plant are hydrogen sulfide and
pentane, both of which can result from various emission sources. Fugitive
geothermal gas emissions containing hydrogen sulfide can occur from leaks in
power plant components such as compressors, pumps, pipe fittings, valves, etc.
Treated geothermal gas emissions containing hydrogen sulfide are released
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from the ESRF when there is overpressurization in the main geothermal stearn
supply line to the power plant. Treated geothermal gas emissions containing
hydrogen sulfide are released from the Sulfa-Treat system which receives vent
gas from the turbine seals. Fugitive pentane emissions can occur from leaks
in the Ormat units due to leaks in flanges, fittings, valves, and pumps.
Treated pentane emissions occur from the vapor recovery unit which treats
gases vented from the pentane condenser.
Power plant emISSIons are regulated under HDOH permit PTO No.
P-834-1582. The permit, dated September 23, 1993, is effective until July 1,
1995' and specifies emission control, monitoring, and reporting requirements.
Air pollution issues identified by NEIC for power plant operations are
associated with:
• Fugitive emissions containing hydrogen sulfide
-----" ....
• ESRF system design
• Spare geothermal condensate return pump
• Pentane emissions
• Fugitive pentane emission monitoring
----------_., .- -- .. -
Fugitive Emissions Containing Hydrogen Sulfide
Hydrogen sulfide emissions are limited by special condition 20 of
Attachment II, PTO No. P-834-1582. Condition 20 limits the hydrogen sulfide
emissions to less than lIb/day. PGV is not required by the permit to monitor
or otherwise calculate the actual release rate of hydrogen sulfide. PGV stated
PGV has applied for renewal of the permit. HDGH has not reissued the permit;
however, in accordance with Hawaii air regulations, the existing permit remains valid.
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that although they do not calculate a daily release rate they have an extensive
in-plant and plant peripheral hydrogen sulfide sensing system. They reported
that when any of these monitors sense a concentration of hydrogen sulfide
greater than 10 ppm at internal monitor locations, or 5 ppm at peripheral
process locations, an alarm is sounded which is immediately responded to by
plant operators. Using hand-held hydrogen sulfide detectors, operating
personnel reportedly then locate the source of the leak which is repaired
immediately.
NEIC conducted an inspection of plant areas that are expected to be
more prone to leakage, such as equipment with moving parts with vibrations
that could result in line or fitting separations. Where hydrogen sulfide odors
were detected, a hand-held Omni 4000 hydrogen sulfide analyzer was used to
"sniff' the area to determine the magnitude of the leak. Only very slight,
nonpersistent odors were detected in areas near the noncondensible
compressors, production wellheads, and~ulfa-Treatdischarge. No measurable
hydrogen sulfide was detected (lower detection level 1 ppm). ~~:~e.. """,
o c.J--r-pp.., la (
NEIC reviewed the PGV system for recording in-plant hydrogen sulfide
analyzer information. Figure 3 shows the location of the monitors.
Concentrations are sensed at the monitor location and transmitted to the
alarm system, strip charts, and plant computer located in the control room.
The computer does not maintain alarm or hydrogen sulfide concentration
history for any of the monitor locations beyond 90 days, maximum. There are
also no data available for tracking online operating times of each individual
monitor. PGV operating personnel stated that in-plant hydrogen sulfide
alarms occur approximately six times per year and are of variable duration.
They are nQt.reported to HDOH. Dave Berube, former plant manager, stated
~- ~ ~
that there are no particular plant areas that have been found to be more prone
to hydrogen sulfide leakage than other areas.
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• Fixed point HaS monitor
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ESRF System Design
NEIC examined the incident reports for the ESRF since 1992. Emission
data from those reports are summarized in Table 1. The incident reports
stated that excess emissions occurred in 1992 at low steam flow conditions
(less than about 120t OOO Ibslhr) due to poor controllability. 6 line redacted due
to Confidential Business Infonnalion.
Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business InfonnaJion..
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Page redacted due to Confidential Business InJVnnation.
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Table 5 . Two Phase Engineering and Research ESRF RecommenclatWns
Redacted due to Confidential Business Information
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Spare Geothermal Condensate Return Pump
An installed spare geothermal fluid pump IS required by special
condition 6 of Attachment II, PTa No. P-834-1582. Mr. Bruce Davis, PGV
(Constellation Energy) attorney, stated that PGV interpreted this condition in
the permit to apply to only the brine return pumps, which are no longer
necessary because PGV relies on the pressure in· the geothermal fluid for
reinjection of the brine. PGV does not believe that the condensate pumps that
transfer geothermal condensate from the power plant are regulated by this
condition of the permit. Mr. Peter Arthur, PGV, stated that a spare
condensate pump is kept, however, in the maintenance shop located adjacent
to the pump installation.
NEIC inspected the condensate reinjection pumps 40-P-47A, B, and C,
which were all operating at the time of the inspection. Geothermal condensate
represents a significant part of the liquid fluid which must be reinjected. It
contains hydrogen sulfide concentrations comparable to those found in the
brine removed at the wellhead. The installed spare geothermal fluid return
capacity requirements should apply to any pumps used for reinjection of
geothermal fluids, and whose malfunction may necessitate that geothermal
steam be released directly to the atmosphere.
Total Pentane Emissions
Pentane emissions are limited by special conditions 2 and 3 of
Attachment II of PrO No. P-834-1582. Total pentane emissions from all 10
Onnat Energy Converters (OECs), including fugitive leaks, are limited to less
than 200 pounds per day. PGV is required to report the amount of pentane
released each quarter. PGV calculates quarterly pentane losses by taking the
difference between the beginning and ending inventories of the two pentane
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storage tanks (tanks 40-V-42-A and B) plus any purchases. This calculation
method is the most appropriate procedure in determining the actual pentane
losses.
----------... NEIC reviewed PGV's total reported pentane emissions ·for 1994. PGV
inventory records of 1994 quarterly pentane losses, as reported to the
Department of Health, are summarized below:
9,472
11,680
11,449
9,125
Pentane Emission in PoundsQuarter
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
Because inventory records are reconciled only on a quarterly basis, it is not
possible to determine ifthe 200-pound-per-day limit has been exceeded, unless
greater than 18,000 pounds (200 pounds/day x 90 days) are reported for a
quarterly loss.
Based on the lack of any reported pentane spills and the extremely low
fugitive leak rate (discussed below), reported quarterly pentane losses cannot
be accounted for through fugitive losses: A combination of factors likely
contribute to the reported quarterly losses, as identified below:
• PGV has reported incorrect or incomplete monitoring results
based on sampling procedures outlined in the permit. These
issues are discussed later in this section.
T·
......;..
Fugitive losses are the combined pentane eniissions which occur from any seal, flange
valve, or other fugitive emiuion point.
43
v
~---------------"----"
• Not all fugitive emission points are included in the PGV
monitoring program. This issue is discussed later.
• Other sources, such as the noncondensible gas vent for the vapor
recovery unit, have not been included in the monitoring program.
The vapor recovery unit (VRU) treats gases vented from the pentane
accumulator. Using a refrigeration system, the VRU condenses pentane, which
is returned to the pentane storage tanks, and discharges noncondensible gases.
Records are not maintained or required to be maintained as to the quantity of
pentane condensed and returned to storage. Additionally, there are no
requirements to quantify the amount of pentane released through the
noncondensible gas vent stack. Records are, however, maintained for the
quantity of pentane transferred from the pentane tanks to the OECs. These
pentane transfer records are required by condition 5 Attachment II of Permit
P-834-1582. Pentane transfer records were provided for the first and second
quarters of 1994, but not included in the third and fourth quarterly reports
submitted to HDOH.
Review of the quarterly pentane transfer records show large variations
in the amount of pentane transferred to the various OECs. The amount of
'pentane transferred to the individual OECs for the first and second quarters
is summarized in Table 6. The quarterly transfers range from about 250 to
2,800 gallons. Typically, transfer quantities are several hundred gallons;
however, a single daily transfer of2,774 pounds was reported on May 18, 1994
to OEC 23. Large single transfers, or large cumulative quarterly transfers,
may be indicative of problems within particular OECs, or may correspond to
maintenance activities. Information is not recorded as to why the transfers
were necessary.
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Table 6
FIRST AND SECOND QUARTER 1994 PENTANE TRANSFERS
TO OECS
Puna Geothermal Venture
Pahoa, Hawaii
1st Quarter Transfers 2nd Quarter Transfers
OEC Number (gallons) (gallons)
11 3,902 617
12 266 252
13 530 505
14 1,176 930
15 786 199
21 1,505 1,348
22 2,648 478
23 767 2,774
24 2,820 1,670
25 2,146 267
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Explanations for large pentane transfers should be included on the
quarterly reports. This information would provide operational history of the
individual OECs and may be useful in scheduling preventative maintenance
activities, such as increased frequency monitoring for an OEC requiring
frequent pentane transfers.
Pentane Fugitive Emission Monitorini
Fugitive pentane emISSIOns are limited by special condition 2 of
Attachment II of PTO No. P-834-1582. Fugitive emissions shall not exceed
0.4 lbslhr or 1,000 ppm from any seal, flange, valve, or other fugitive point
when measured from a distance of 2 inches. All fugitive emission points are
to be measured on a weekly basis. Quarterly reports submitted to the
Department of Health are required to:
• Identify the number of fugitive emission points exceeding the
1,000 ppm limit
• Quantify the amount of pentane released for the quarter
• Provide information on the date· and amount of pentane
transferred to and from each OEC module
As part of the pav fugitive pentane monitoring, ~IC reviewed the
1994 quarterly reports submitted to the Department of Health (Appendix MJ,
evaluated the pav fugitive emission monitoring plan, and monitored
approximately 50 fugitive emission points.
pav has established a fugitive emission monitoring program requiring
the operators to monitor on a weekly basis each of the components listed on
46
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the fugitive emissions monitoring records. Separate monitoring records
[Appendix N] have been prepared for the OECs and pentane storage tanks.
Fifty-one components are listed on the OEC monitoring record. (Because each
of the OECs are identical in construction, a single list can be duplicated for
each of the 10 OECs.) Twenty-seven components are listed on the "storage
tank and header" monitoring record.
The PGV monitoring and reporting procedures require that components
be monitored in accordance with the permit requirements: specifically, that
monitOring be conducted at 2 inches from the component. The PGV procedures
state, "Sniff at the listed source point (sample as close as possible). If a
reading of 1,000 ppm is indicated, move the probe back to 2 inches from the
source point and do a second reading. II The reading taken at the 2-inch
distance is recorded on the log. rov uses a Bacharach TLV instrument to
conduct all fugitive monitoring, and facility personnel are responsible for
monitoring process units assigned to their shift.
The 1994 monitoring records indicate that no leaking components (1,000
ppm at 2 inches) were detected. However, numerous leaks have been recorded
when the initial monitoring is conducted "as close as possible" (at the
component interface). Component monitoring at a point other than the
component interface dramatically reduces the effectiveness and purpose of
fugitive emission monitoring. The EPA-accepted fugitive monitoring
procedures· require monitoring at the component interface.
NEIC conducted fugitive monitoring at OEC 24 and at the pentane
storage tanks. NEIC monitoring was performed using a Foxboro OVA-lOB.
The instrument was calibrated prior to use with zero air, 1,000 ppm, and
Method 21, as referenced in Appendix A 40 CFR part 60.
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10,000 ppm gas standards. OEC 24 and the pentane storage tanks were
selected for monitoring because these areas had been monitored earlier in the
day by PGV personnel. (The time difference between the NEIC and PGV
monitoring should have little impact on monitoring results.) NEIC monitoring
was conducted at both the component interface and at a distance of
approximately 2 inches.
Different fugitive monitoring results were obtained from the PGV and
NEIC sampling. PGV fugitive sampling [Appendix N] reported no monitoring
reading above background levels for any components when monitoring at the
interface. NEIC monitoring at the interface identified seven components
[Table 7] with emissions greater than background levels, of which four were
leaking at greater than 1,000 ppm. Monitoring readings for these four valves
were reduced to less than 1,000 ppm when the monitoring distance was
increased to 2 inches. NEIC sampling confirmed that no reading above
background levels were detected at the pentane storage tanks.
The difference in monitoring results may be explained by either of, or
a combination of, the two factors identified below:
• The response time of monitoring equipment varied. The OVA
instrument responds very quickly to changes in pentane
concentrations. The Bacharach instrument required a minute or
longer before leveling out at constant readings.
• The NEIC monitoring procedures were perhaps more diligently
performed than those used by PGV personnel.
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v
NEIC FUGITIVE MONITORING RESULTS OEC NO. 24
Puna Geothermal Venture
Pahoa, Hawaii
NEIC NEIC PGV
PGV Interface 2·Inch 2·Inch
Location Reading Reading" Reading"
Number Description (ppm) (ppm) (ppm)
2 Feed pump isolation valve 10,000 0 0
4- Plug in pump filter cover 2,000 300 0
r Pump discharge pump valve 300 30 0
26 Bypass valve flange 200 0 0
30 Preheated discharge flange 100 0 0
35 Conavlpanelvaporizer 7,000 75 0
isolation valve
50 Turbine drain valVe 4,000 10 0
2-inch dUtana .p«i.(Ud in ~rmit
CompoMnt rwt itUlltiftttd 011 lWi'YJ. NumlHr corrupollJ:U to Marest auailable component.
After NEIC personnel pointed out the specific location of the emission source,
PGV personnel were able to verify magnitude and location of the leak. The
NEIC OVA instrument reading would stabilize at the maximum reading within
5 seconds. At leak concentrations greater than 1,000 ppm, the PGV Bacharach
instrument would require up to 1 minute before stabilizing at the maximum
concentration.
NEIC fugitive monitoring of OEC 24 required approximately 1 hour.
NEIC did not monitor 12 components in OEC 24, which required special safety
or hoisting equipment to reach inaccessible components. PGV personnel were
reportedly able to complete monitoring within 20 minutes including the
inaccessible components.
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After observing NEIC monitoring procedures, PGV operators had the
opportunity to use the NEIC monitoring equipment. PGV personnel indicated
that after seeing the difference in the two instruments, that future monitoring
would be conducted more deliberately to allow for the slower response of their
instrument.
All potential fugitive emission components are not currently monitored
by PGV. At least two components in OEC 24 (plug-in pump filter cover and
the check valve on the pump discharge), and none of the components on the air
coolers (neither the valves nor the fin fan plugs) are monitored on a regular
basis. In a letter dated March 10, 1995 [Appendix 0], PGV stated that these
components had been monitored during the initial startup in 1993, and no
leaks had been found and, therefore, PGV determined that these points were
not "fugitive pentane points." The PGV interpretation is inconsistent with
other fugitive monitoring programs inspected by NEIC.
The PGV calibration gas standards do not meet the requirements
specified in Method 21 of 40 CFR Part 60 Appendix A. The PGV calibration
gas standards do not have a specified shelf life, as required in Appendix A
Method 21 of 40 CFR Part 60. The current PGV calibration gas standards
were purchased with the Bacharach instrument in 1993. Typical gas
standards have a shelf life of 1 year.
AMBIENT AIR MONITORING SYSTEM
The ambient air monitoring system for the PGV facility consists of three
stations operated by PGV and four" stations operated by HDOH. The three
Subsequent to the NEIC inspection, one monitoring station (station F) has been
shutdown pending relocation.
50
~---_._._._._.. _ _ _.........•_ _._--_ _....... . __._.._.._-.- .._---_.__ -----_ _.
PGV stations [photographs 4 and sf have been an ongoing requirement of the
wellfield and power plant air permits. The HDOH stations [photographs 6
and 7] were installed by the state in order to supplement and provide an
independent check of the PGV monitoring system. Figure 1 shows the location
of the six stations.
Th~ three PGV stations are referred to in the PGV monthly reports as
Southeast, Southwest, and West stati~~ (designations for these stations are
more currently referred to in other documents as stations A, B, and C,
respectively). The location of the W (C) station is proximate to residential
areas, although it is not in a prevailing downwind direction from PGV
facilities. The SW (B) and SE (A) stations are located in the prevailing
downwind and topographically downgradient directions from the PGV property
boundary, respectively. All three monitoring sites are instrumented with
similar systems for monitoring ambient levels of HJ' and local meteorology
(wind speed, wind direction, sigma theta, ambient temperature, ambient
relative humidity, and precipitation). Two high-vqlume PM10 samplers are also
located at the SW (B) station.
The three HDOH stations (D, E, and G) also have continuous H2S
analyzers and meteorological monitors. They are operated and maintained by
the HDOH's Clean Air Branch. Station D is approximately 500 feet south of
the PGV facility, in the prevailing downwind direction. Station E is almost
6,000 feet southwest. Station G is located about 6,000 feet northwest of PGV
facilities.
Ambient air monitoring data for the PGV and HDOH stations are
recorded in a number of computer and direct readout systems. The primary
Photographs have bun included for only two of the monitoring stations.
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method of data acquisition for the PGV data is by telephone to a computer
located in the PGV control room. EnvirolLoggers are also located at each
station along with a complementary system of strip chart recorders. Similar
provisions for readout at the HDOH stations are made. Contemporaneous
HDOH data also can be accessed from the PGV control room, but it is not
summarized in a computer data base.
"';:.
Ambient air monitoring requirements have been specified in previous
and current air permits for the power plant and wellfield. Requirements for
the three PGV monitoring stations are currently stated in special condition 10
of Attachment II, PrO No. P-834-I582, and special condition 5 of
Attachment II, PrO No. P-833-I524. Air quality and meteorological data must
be summarized and submitted monthly in writing to the HDOH. The
combined emissions of hydrogen sulfide from the power plant and the
associated wellfield, including periods ofequipment failure or malfunctions are
not allowed to cause or contribute to an exceedance of the H2S ambient level
of 10 ppb on a 24-hour rolling average or 25 ppb on a I-hour average at or
beyond the project boundary (special condition 23, Attachment II, PrO No. P-
833-1524). During the 31-hour KS-8 blowdown, there were exceedances ofboth
the I-hour and the rolling 24-hour limitations. In addition, there have been
two other incidents of exceedances of the I-hour standard, both associated with
leaks from wellhead flanges, as shown in Table 1.
NEIC reviewed monthly hydrogen sulfide reports maintained by PGV.
The monthly reports provide hour-by-hour readings for required ambient air
parameters [Appendix P]. They do not summarize analyzer online times!
reliability or provide analyses of H2S and meteorological monitoring results.
Data on trends and overall project impacts are difficult to extract. A summary
of data for the last 6 months of 1994, prepared by NEIC, is provided in
Table 8. The average daily hydrogen sulfide concentration at each station was
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Table 8
PGV H2S AMBIENT MONITOR SUMMARY DATA
Puna Geothermal Venture
Pahoa, Hawaii
Total II
6-month
07194 08194 09194 10194 11/94 12194 Period
'I
w (e) Station
Average daily HtS ~ntration (ppb) 0.6 0.9 1.6 1.4 NA· 1.2 1.1 II
Maximum daily H,S concentration (ppb) 5.0 3.1 3.8 3.1 NA 3.6 5.0
Percent HtS analyzer online time 98.2 99.2 89.4 87.6 0 7.4 63.6 I!I
Number days with negative average 3 0 0 0 NA NA 3
concentrations
IISE (A) Station
Average daily H~ ~ncentration (ppb) 0.7 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.1 II
Maximum daily HtS conc:entration (ppb) 2.0 3.4 4.3 5.1 4.4 3.8 5.1 II
Percent H~ analyzer online time 99.0 99.4 93.5 98.3 97.8 99.3 97.9 /I
Number days with negative average HtS 4 0 4 4 0 2 16 I,
concentrations
SW (B) Station I:
, ,
Average daily HtS concentration (ppb) 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.2 1.3 0.9 1.1
Maximum daily l4S concentration (ppb) 2.9 3.8 3.1 3.0 12.2·· 6.4 12.2 11
Percent~ analyzer online time 98.9 98.6 95.1 98.7 92.8 99.6 97.5
Number days with negative average HtS 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 II
readings
..
....
Not aruzlyud • aruzlyzer down for rtpair
Three hourly reading_ following calibration exceeded 10 ppb on November 30. 1994.
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1.1 ppb. The highest maximum concentration was 12.2 ppb recorded at the
SW (B) station in November. The overall reliability (online time) of the
hydrogen sulfide analyzers was 86%, due primarily to the W (C) station
analyzer being out of service for 2 months. The analyzer at the SE (A) station
had an abnormally large amount of days with negative hydrogen sulfide
concentrations (16), almost 10% of the 6-month period. Negative values were
not explained by PGV. There were no exceedances of the ambient
concentration limits, and PGV reported no HzS release incidents for the period.
Air monitoring issues identified by NEIC during the site investigation
involved:
• Unresolved items from the 1991 KS-8 incident investigation
• Calibration time periods for hydrogen sulfide monitors
• Spare hydrogen sulfide analyzer
• Hydrogen sulfide/meteorological data summaries
Unresolved Items from the 1991 KS-8 Incident Investigation
An investigation of air monitoring issues was conducted after the
unplanned venting incident involving KS-8. The investigation was conducted
as part of element III of the Geothermal Action Plan by the state of Hawaii.
It was conducted by an independent investigative team consisting of Robert L.
Reynolds, Lake County Air Quality Management District, California; and Dr.
Wilson B. Goddard, Goddard and Goddard Engineering, also of California. The
team reviewed a number of air issues and made several recommendations
regarding the ambient air program [Appendix Q]. Although a number of the
recommendations made were adopted, there are some unresolved issues from
that work which merit further consideration.
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The investigators recommended that the air monitoring systems should
be unified into a single, comprehensive program, managed and audited by the
state with input from PGV and the community. This recommendation still has
merit and would ensure uniformity in meeting quality assurance requirements
between the existing PGV and HDOH monitoring systems. . It would also
promote the integration of data from all monitoring systems into a common
data management and summary report system. HDOH and PGV should
evaluate costs and time frames for accomplishing this objective.
Calibration Time Periods for Hydro~en Sulfide Monitors
PGV calibrates all three hydrogen sulfide monitors during the 12
midnight to 1 a.m. time period. No PGV monitoring of ambient air hydrogen
sulfide .concentrations occurs during that I-hour time period. It would be
advisable to stagger the calibration period for these monitors so that at least
two monitors will be in operation at all times.
Spare Hydrogen Sulfide Analyzer
PGV maintains some spare parts on-site for hydrogen sulfide analyzers;
however, there is no spare analyzer. During the NEIC investigation, PGVair
monitoring consultant, Kim Borne, was questioned about the H2S analyzer
reading fluctuations that were occurring at the SE (A) station analyzer. He
replied that the analyzer was probably in need of some repair but, due to lead
times, was not to be taken out of service in the near future. In addition, the
W (C) station analyzer underwent a 2-month outage for repairs, substantially
exceeding the 4- to 5-day repair period that was initially anticipated. The
purchase ofa spare hydrogen analyzer would significantly improve instrument
availability.
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Hydrogen Sulfide Data Summaries
Monthly ambient air monitoring data summaries are required by the air
permits for the wellfield and power plant. The requirement for the data
summaries are not further defined in the permit. PGV includes hour-by-hour
data summaries in their monthly reports. No summary information on past
instrument readings is provided. No information is included on analyzer
online time in the monthly report.
Data collected from the HDOH monitor locations are not summarized by
PGV. The permit does not require HDOH data to be included in the PGV
monthly reports. HDOH is reportedly working on recording analyzer data in
a data logger to better integrate all ambient monitoring data, but it is not clear
when this task will be completed.
Several reporting changes can be made to improve ambient air summary
data and data usefulness for the PGV facility.
• Ambient air and meteorological data from the HDOH monitoring
stations should be included in the PGV monthly reports to make
the reports more comprehensive.
• Data summaries should be included for each hydrogen sulfide
analyzer location to show dates, durations, and likely causes of
past hydrogen sulfide readings from the start of the project.
Trends and correlations with meteorological conditions can then
be conducted. Wind roses can also be prepared.
• Data should be included for each hydrogen sulfide analyzer to
show availability and online time percentages of the start of the
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project. Additionally, information regarding daily average, daily
maximum, and list ofpermit limit exceedances should be included
with the summary.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Areas of Noncompliance
.~--"
v
Permit P-833-1524
Attachment II, Condition 20
Permit P-834.1582
Attachment II, Condition 5
Permit P-834.1582
Attachment II, Condition 10
Permit P-834-1582
Attachment II, Condition 2
Semiannual sampling and reporting of the
geothermal resource has not been performed
for all required parameters. No annual or
semiannual resource testing, while operating
under normal conditions, was provided to
HDOH, prior to 1995. After the NEIC
inspection, PGV reported 1994 results
compiled from various test locations. NEIC
determined that 15 of the required 78
parameters were validly reported for well
KS-9, and 37 of 78 for well KS-10. This did
not include the three parameters that PGV
reported were impossible to monitor, or were
redundant with other parameters.
PGV does not have an installed spare
condensate pump. A spare pump is kept in
an adjacent warehouse which does not allow
it to be utilized immediately upon
identification of a malfunction of one of the
three operating pumps.
Air quality and meteorological data from the
ambient monitoring· stations are not
summarized in the monthly reports provided
to HDOH.
Some fugitive emISSIon points are not
monitored on a weekly basis. Potential
fugitive emission points on the fan coolers and
OECa have not been monitored since startup
of the plant.
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Permit P-834-1582
Attachment II, Condition 5
Areas of Concern
Pentane transfer records were not included
with the third and fourth 1994 quarterly
reports.
• Not all National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
(NESHAP) pollutants required to be monitored by the permit are
present in the geothermal fluids. Hawaii Department of Health
(HDOH) should require sampling of only those NESHAP pollutants
which are specifically of interest [PTO P-833-1524, Attachment II,
Condition 20].
• HDOH requires that Best Available Control Technology (BACT) be used
during periods of well equipment failure or malfunction (Permit P-833-
1524 and Permit P-834-1592), but does not define BACT in the permits.
HDOH should also clarify whether or not BACT requirements apply to
well drilling operations. IfHDOH intends for those practices described
in the drill plans [which are to be approved by the Hawaii Department
of Land and Natural Resources (HDLNR)] to constitute BACT then this
fact should be made clear in the permit [PTO P-833-1524,
Attachment II, Condition 13].
• Drilling plans prepared after the 1991 KS-8 well incident do not address
all recommendations made in independent investigations, or
investigations by PGV, subsequent to that incident. These include
provisions for adequate kill fluid temperatures and quantities,
maximum-sized mud pump liners, and weight criteria. Also there is no
apparent written requirement in the drill plan for the addition of lime
to the recirculating wellbore fluids. HDOH should review
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recommendations made in the 1991 investigation, and PGV's response
to those recommendations, as well as drill mud lime requirements to
ensure that all necessary precautions are being taken.
• There are limited means to verify compliance with the plant-wide 200
pounds per day pentane emission limit. Pentane inventory levels are
reconciled only on a quarterly basis and, therefore, daily exceedances
can only be confirmed if the total emissions for the quarter exceed
18,000 pounds (90 days per quarter X 200 pounds per day), or if there
is a report of a catastrophic release [PTO P-834-1524, Attachment II,
Condition 3].
• The permit limitation offugitive hydrogen sulfide emissions to less than
1 IbIhr is unmeasurable and, therefore, unenforceable. An option to
addressing fugitive hydrogen>sulfide emissions is to impose additional
requirements on PGVseXistingin-plant hydrogen sulfide monitoring
system. These requirements could address minimum allowable monitor
> downtime, monitor calibration and identification of plant areas or
equipment where repetitive leaks occur [PTO P-834-1524, Attachment
II, Condition 20].
• The Emergency Steam ReliefFacility (ESRF) design, modifications, and
consultant recommendations, and PGV's response to these
recommendations and the related NEIC evaluation, should be reviewed
to ensure that the 1992 ESRF problems have been adequately
addressed. NEIC's evaluation indicates that there are still potential
problems.
• Explanations for large pentane transfers should be included on the
quarterly air reports. This information would provide operational
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history of the individual OECs and could be useful in scheduling
preventative maintenance activities, such as increased frequency
monitoring for OEC requiring frequent pentane transfers [PTO P-834-
1524, Attachment II, Condition 5].
• The noncondensible gas vent from the Vapor Recovery Unit (VRU)
should be included in the volatile organic compounds (VOC) monitoring
program. Monitoring readings may demonstrate that this vent stack is
a significant source for pentane losses.
• Fugitive pentane monitoring at a distance of2 inches, as required by the
permit, is not appropriate. The facility has not identified any leaking
components since the program was initiated. NEIC identified four
components leaking at greater than 1,000 ppm when measured at the
interface; however, when the monitoring distance was increased to 2
inches, the readings dropped below the 1,000 ppm limit specified in the
permit. The EPA approved fugitive monitoring method, Method 21
Appendix A of CFR 40 Part 60, requires that fugitive monitoring be
conducted at the component interface [PTO P-834-1524, Attachment II,
Condition 2].
• The number of components identified by NEIC to be leaking, at levels
above background, is greater than that identified by PGV monitoring.
NEIC identified seven components leaking at greater than 100 ppm of
which four were leaking at greater than 1,000 ppm when monitoring at
the component interface. Previous monitoring at the component
interface, in the same area, by PGV personnel identified only one
leaking component at a concentration of 100 ppm. Due to the slower
response time of the PGV monitoring equipment, PGV operators will
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need to be more deliberate while monitoring potential fugitive emission
sources.
• The fugitive monitoring calibration gas used by PGV did not display a
manufacture or expiration date. The approved fugitive monitoring
method, Method 21 Appendix A of CFR 40 Part 60, requires that
calibration gases display a manufacture date.
• Hydrogen sulfide and meteorological monitoring data should be
reviewed, evaluated, and summarized on the required reports.
Currently, all the monitoring data is supplied without summary or
reporting of upset conditions. Combining HDOH and PGV monitoring
data into a single program would allow for a comprehensive evaluation
of all available data.
• The online time for the three PGV-operated ambient air monitors is only
86% for the last 6 months. The west air monitor was the least reliable
and was only operational for 64% of the time. The PGV should purchase
a spare H2S analyzer to eliminate equipment downtime gaps which have
occurred in the past monitoring periods.
• PGV should stagger the calibration period for the H2S analyzers so that
at least two analyzers are in operation at all times.
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*UNDERGROUND INJECTION CONTROL
The underground reinjection of the used geothermal fluid is regulated
by the conditions specified in the mc permit Number UH-1529 [Appendix RJ.
The permit limits the reinjection quantity and also establishes operating
conditions and identifies monitoring/reporting requirements. The permit
regulates reinjection activities for three wells, KS-IA, KS-3, and KS-4.
As part of the inspection, Regional and NEIC inspectors examined the
injection and production wells, three groundwater monitoring wells, the
emergency steam release system, and the mud pits. Samples were collected
from the recombined geothermal injectate flow and groundwater monitoring
wells, MW-l and MW-2. Sampling analytical results are presented in
Appendix S.
This portion of the report is divided into four sections: the injection
wells, monitoring wells, emergency steam relief system, and the mud pits.
INJECTION WELLS
Quantity
The permit limits the quantity of geothermal injectate to approximately
675,000 lbs/hour. The injectate is made of four primary streams: steam
condensate, brine, supplemental water, and total noncondensible gases.
Stormwater collected in the ESRF pit is also reinjected and included on the
monthly mc reports. The permit estimates the injectate composition as
follows:
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Source
Steam condensate
Brine
Supplemental water
Total noncondensible gases
Approximate Flow Obslhr>
505,816
128,250
39,751
1,183
PGV submitted a letter [Appendix T] on September 15, 1994 to the
HDOH indicating that the facility had exceeded the 675,000 Ibs/hr limitation.
The reported dates and rates for the exceedances are listed below.
Dm
09018194
09/09194
09/10194
09/11194
09/12/94
Reported Flow Obslhr)
707,000
752,000
753,000
731,000
752,000
A review of the records indicate that on at least five other dates,· after
September 12, 1994. the 675,000-lbs/hr limit was exceeded. These exceedances
were not reported to HDOH until December 22, 1994 with the submittal of the
Quarterly Injection Well Status Report. PGV personnel reported that the
HDOH had granted permission for injectate rates greater than 675,000 lbs/hr
during the telephone notification of the first five exceedances. Documentation
of this could not be provided by PGV. [May be additional violations, have not
been provided with the fourth quarter 1994 report or reports.]
PGV submitted a me permit revision request to the HDOH on May 9,
1994 requesting a higher injection rate allowance. The HDOH is currently
reviewing the permit revision. On November 7, 1994 HDOH issued a letter
SubseqlU!nt to the NEIC inspection, the BOOB UIC program provickd information that
the 675,000 lbs 1hr limit had been exceeded on 13 other-dates after September 12, 1994.
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which granted an "interim increase" in the injection quantity and rate from
675,000 lbs/hr to 1,111,800 lbs/hr. This "interim increase" authorized
increased reinjection until February 28, 1995. This "interim increase" has
subsequently been extended to May 31, 1995, then to August 31, 1995, then to
December 31, 1995, and is currently authorized until April 20, 1996.
The calculation procedures used to report the hourly injectate rates may
not accurately reflect the true hourly injectate rates. The monthly and
quarterly mc data reports list daily injection rate totals, as required by the
permit. However, the permit limits the injection rate based on an hourly limit,
specifically 675,000 lbs/hr. PGV calculates, and subsequently reports, the
average hourly flow rate by dividing the daily total mass quantity by 24 hours.
This calculation procedure results in the reporting of the average hourly flow
rate, as opposed to the actual hourly flow rate. Based on the fluctuations in
the daily average flow rates, it is likely that the hourly flow rates are also
variable which may have resulted in unreported hourly periods when the
injection rate exceeded the permitted limits.
Sampling
The mc permit reqUlres that sampling for certain parameters be
conducted on the injectate. Sampling parameters and frequencies are specified
in the permit as either Type I, Type II, or Type III. Type I samples are
generally metals or conventional parameters (different parameters for liquid
or gas phases), Type II samples are hazardous waste constituents (TCLP), and
Type III are generally volatile compounds. Concentration limits have not been
set for these constituents; however, a sampling schedule and reporting
requirements have been incorporated into the permit.
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One sample of the injectate was collected during the NEIC inspection in
order to assess its characteristics using selected parameters. The sample was
collected from well pad A at a point where the brine, steam condensate, and
noncondensible gases had combined [photograph 10]. Calculations based on
the flow and pressure readings, during sampling, indicated that the injectate
was in single phase (liquid). Type I NEIC sampling results are compared to
the most recent PGV results (December 19941January 1995) in Table 9. There
is little difference between the NEIC and PGV analytical results for Type I
parameters.
The permit includes fluorine, chlorine, bromine, and iodine in the Type I
parameters, but instead of reporting these, PGV reported results for fluorides,
chlorides, and bromides. NEIC included chloride results for comparison.
PGV reported analytical results for all required noncondensible gas
parameters except for helium. Helium is an inert gas and has no impact on
the surrounding environment.
For the Type II parameters, the NEIC and PGV analytical results were
similar. NEIC and PGV analyses both show all parameters below the level of
detection, except for benzene, arsenic, and barium. PGV analyses showed the
benzene concentration to be 12 parts per billion (ppb) and NEIC results were
below the level of detection (LOD) or 25 ppm. The higher LOD for the NEIC
samples resulted from sample dilutions necessary to avoid damage to
analytical equipment from high sulfide concentrations in the sample. The
concentrations for arsenic and barium were also comparable as shown below.
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Table 9
TYPE I INJECTATE SAMPLING RESULTS
Puna Geothermal Venture
Pahoa, Hawaii
July 1994 Puna Sample
Constituent NEIC Sample Results (mglkg) (mglkg)
Lithium 0.997 1.10
Sodium 2,410
Potassium 566
Magnesium 0.103
Calcium 55 59.1
Barium 2.82 3.95
Vanadium 0.007 <0.02
Chromium <0.008 0.017
Manganese 0.236 0.302
Iron 0.70 0.488
Nickel 0.01 <0.005
Copper <0.005 <0.02
Silver 0.004 <0.02
Zinc 0.010 <0.01
Cadmium 0.005 <0.0013
Mercury <0.0002 <0.003
Boron 2.8 2.81
Lead 0.002 <0.001
Arsenic 0.052 0.145
Selenium 0.004 <0.25
Fluorine (Fluoride ?)" 0.091
Chlorine (Chloride?)" 3,000 4,270
Bromine (Bromide ?)" 13.7
Iodine Not reported
Ammonia <0.2
Sulfate 4.09
Thiosulfate <0.13
Nitrate 7.3 <1.4
Alkalinity, as HC03 <2.0
Silica 339
TDS 8,100
TSS 12.0
Conductivity 11,500
pH 5.7 4.92
Assumes fluoride. chloride, and bromide compounds were reported rather than fluorine,
chlorine, and bromine gases. NEIC value represents chloride concentration.
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Arsenic
Barium
NEIC results
2.82 ppm
0.052 ppm
PGV results
3.95 ppm
0.145 ppm
PGV reported analytical results for m- and p-cresol as a combined value
rather than individual parameters, as required in the permit. It should be
noted however, that the concentration for the combined isomers is below the
LOD.
Type III analytical results from both NEIC and PGV were below the
LOD for all reported parameters, except for toluene. PGV reported 0.004 ppm,
whereas NEIC results were below the LOD, 0.025 mgIL. PGV failed to report
values for seven of the required parameters [Appendix Ul.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
2-Chloroethylvinyl ether·· .
Dibromochloromethane
-l,l-Dichloroethane
1,2-Dichloropropane
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane
1,1,I-Trichloroethane
1,1,2-Trichloroethane
PGV injectate sampling procedures may have resulted in underreporting
of volatile constituents because of the elevated sampling temperatures.
According to PGV personnel, previous samples were reportedly partially cooled
in a double pipe heat exchanger using plant water; however, temperatures
were not recorded. During the NEIC sampling, the double pipe heat exchanger
was used and an additional cooling coil immersed in ice was required to cool
the sample to an appropriate temperature. Using the ice cooled coil, the
samples were collected at about 23°C (73 OF). PGV personnel reportedly had
not previously used the iced coil to collect samples.
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PGV and the state should consider modifying the mc permit to include
appropriate chemicals for analyses. PGV has not analyzed for all parameters
specified in the permit (e.g., helium) and the state has apparently not
requested this missing information. Several required chemical constituents
could likely be dropped from the permit, or reduce sampling frequency without
impacting the effectiveness of the permit. Additionally, the permit should be
modified to reflect analyses for constituents in the aqueous form rather than
the gaseous form (e.g. chloride rather than chlorine).
Mechanical Integrity Tests
As a requirement of the mc permit, PGV was required to develop and
implement a "Production and Reinjection Well Casing Monitoring Program."
The program calls for annual mechanical integrity tests for each of the wells
consisting of a shut-in temperature survey and a casing pressure test.
Procedures to be used for these tests are included in the well casing program.
Paragraph redacted due to Confidential Business Information.
Well Annulus Pressure
The VIC permit reqUIres that the annulus nitrogen pressure be
continuously monitored and recorded. This information is recorded in the PGV
data system and is displayed at the well building. During the NEIC visit the
KS-3 annulus nitrogen pressure was approximately 975 psi and KS-4 showed
a pressure of about 1,200 psi. The observed pressures are similar to those
documented during normal operation.
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Annulus nitrogen pressure typically remains fairly constant over the
reporting period. There are occasions, however, when the pressure drops by
100 to 200 psi. (These were the largest pressure drops and were reported in
September 1994.) When asked what pressure drop constituents a problem,
PGV personnel could not provide an answer. PGV should consider including
a narrative description for "large" annulus pressure changes in the quarterly
reports. Additionally, the company should develop estimates as to the
acceptable pressure drops or pressure drop rates. Specifically the company
should specify what pressure drop would indicate a loss ofmechanical integrity
during normal operations.
MONITORING WETJS
Provision in the Geothermal Resource Permit, Condition 10, require PGV
to monitor for potential impacts on the surrounding groundwater. As part of
the inspection, NEIC collected samples and observed the PGV sampling
procedures of monitoring wells MW-1 and MW-2.
Observed sampling procedures for MW-2 did not follow the procedures
10 the "SAIC Standard Operating Procedures No. 365 - Monitoring Well
Purging." The procedures call for sampled wells to be purged of 3 to 10 times
their borehole volume of standing water. There was no purging of the well,
which may have resulted in nonrepresentative samples being collected. Water
level in the well was at a surface depth of about 574 feet. A bottom-filling
bailer attached to a hand-operated winch was used to obtain the sample
[photographs 11 and 12]. Based on the depth of this well it is not practical to
hand bail this well 3 to 10 well volumes. The called for procedure should be
altered or a pump should be installed in the well.
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PGV sampling of MW-2, in May and July 1994, identified low
concentrations of chlorinated compounds. The presence of 1,1-Dichloroethane
was detected in the NEIC sample [Table 10]. The company has attributed the
presence of these compounds to contamination introduced during the
installation of downhole monitoring equipment. Phenol and 4-methylphenol,
at low concentrations, were also detected in the NEIC sample.
Table 10
SAMPLING RESULTS OF MW·2
Puna Geothermal Venture
Pahoa, Hawaii
May 1994 Sampling. July 1994 Sampling' February 1995 NEIC
Parameter (ppm) (ppm) (ppm)
Tetrachloroethylene 0.005 0.0025 <0.005
1,1-Dichloroethane 0.010 0.023 0.011
1,2-Dichlorethylene 0.007 0.010 <0.005
Trichloroethylene 0.005 NR" <0.005
Phenol NR NR 0.0031
4-methylphenol NR NR 0.0011
PGV rrported sampling rrsults.
. Not reported
An installed submersible pump was used to purge MW-1 prior to
sampling. No semivolatile compounds (SW846-8260) were detected in MW-1
samples. Additionally, no volatile compounds (SW846-8270) were detected in
MW-l samples.
EMERGENCY STEAM RELIEF SYSTEM
The purpose of the emergency steam relief system is to remove H 2S and
minimize noise associated with emergency release of steam or during well
testing. (Operation of the Emergency Steam Relief System is discussed in the
air portion of this report.) Water which accumulates in the ESRF collection
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Dpond [photograph 9J is intermittently pumped to the reinjection well. The
quantity of water removed and pumped to the reinjection wells is reported on
the monthly VIC reports.
The lower 6 feet of the ESRF pond is lined and has a capacity of about
135,000 gallons. The upper portion of the pond has not been lined
[photographs 8 and 9]. According to PGV personnel, approximately 1 to 2 feet
of water are maintained within the pond which reduces the effective storage
volume to about 94,000 gallons.
PGV estimated the holding time for the collection pond to be 7.8 hours.
This estimate was based on the 94,OOO-gallon capacity and an entering flow
rate of 200 gpm. The 7.8 hour estimate also assumed no withdrawals via
pumping. Holding times would be increased to 10.4 or 31.4 hours with pump
out rates of 50 or 150 gpm, respectively. PGV could not provide a basis for the
200 gpm entering flow rate. Additionally, the pumpout rates could not be
provided during the NEIC inspection.
PGV should document the basis for their assumptions and calculate
retention times for the ESRF collection pond.
MUD PITS
The mud pits associated with the drilling activities have been closed.
The removed mud pit material was sampled and according to LYnn White,
General Manager, was suitable for disposal in the local landfill.· paVelected
The HDOH me program directed the chemical analyses of the mud pit material. The
TCLP analyses demonstrated that the mud pit material qualified as a solid waste
which did not require hazardous material management.
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to landfill the material at a central location within the operating portion of the
facility. The landfilled material has been covered with a liner.
Lynn White reported that duplicate samples for lanclfilled material had
been collected by a state agency. Reportedly, these duplicate samples also
showed the material was suitable for disposal in the local landfill. The RCRA
division ofHDOD was unaware ofany duplicate sampling or analytical results
from the .mud pits. (Other state agencies have not been contacted for copies
of these results.)
SUMMARy OF FINDINGS
Areas of Noncompliance
-
Permit UH-1529 Part
I.A.3(a)
Permit UH-1529
Part I B. 1(0
Injection rate exceeded 675,000 pounds for 10
days during September 1994. Notification
was provided within 1 week to HDOH for five
of the daily exceedances.
PGV does not monitor for all parameters
identified in the permit. Analytical results for
m- and p-cresol isomers were combined rather
than reported separately, as specified for the
Type II sampling. Additionally, for Type III
sampling, the following chemicals were not
reported.
• 2-Chloroethylvinyl ether
• Dibromochloromethane
• 1,1-Dichloroethane
• 1,2-Dichloropropane
• 1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane
• 1,1,I-Trichloroethane
• 1,1,2-Trichloroethane
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The calculation procedures used to report the hourly injectate rates may
not accurately reflect the true hourly injectate rates. PGV calculates,
and subsequently reports, the average hourly flow rate by dividing the
daily total mass quantity by 24 hours. This calculation procedure
results in the reporting of the average hourly flow rate, as opposed to
the actual hourly flow rate.
Permit UH-1529
Part III A. l(a)
Permit UH-1529
Part ill A. l(b)
Areas of Concern
•
PGV did not follow the Standard Operating
Procedures for Monitoring Well Sampling as
referenced in the "Hydrologic Monitoring
Program." There was no purging of the
MW-2. The procedures call for sampled wells
to be purged of 3 to 10 times their borehole
volume of standing water.
PGV did not follow the procedures specified in
the "Production and Reinjection Well Casing
Monitoring Program." Redacted due to
Confidential Business Information.
• PGV should consider including a narrative description for "large"
annulus pressure changes in the Quarterly Injection Well Status
Reports. Additionally. the company should develop estimates as to the
acceptable pressure drops or pressure drop rates. Specifically the
company should specify what pressure drop would indicate a loss of
mechanical integrity during normal operations.
,.
t· • Injectate samples should be further cooled prior to collection. The
existing cooling equipment does not provide sufficient cooling to ensure
that volatile components remain in the sample. The temperature of the
collected samples should be recorded.
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EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT-TO KNOW ACT
PGV is subject to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Provisions in CERCLA require
facilities to report releases of hazardous substances in excess of reportable
quantities to the National Response Center (NRC). PGV is subject to the
Designation, Reportable Quantities, and Notification requirements of 40 CFR
Part 302 (CERCLA § 103, 42 U.S.C. § 9603).
The Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA)
was enacted as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act (SARA) of 1986. EPCRA (also known as SARA Title III) requires regulated
facilities to provide information to EPA, state, and community groups
concerning chemicals handled by the facility and chemical releases. PGV is
. .
subject to the Emergency Planning and Notification requirements of 40 CFR
Part 355 [EPCRA § 304 (42 U.S.C. § 11004)], the Hazardous Chemical
Reporting: Community Right-to-Know requirements of 40 CFR Part 370
[EPCRA § 311 (42 U.S.C. § 11021) and 312 (42 U.S.C. § 11022)].
The facility released H2S, in excess of the EPCRAlCERCLA reportable
quantity, into the air in June 1991 and February 1993. Approximately 2,247
pounds ofH2S were released during the first incident which occurred June 12
through 14, 1991. The second incident occurred on February 8, 1993 and
resulted in the release of approximately 162 pounds of H2S. EPA issued an
administrative complaint to PGV on May 4, 1994 for failure to immediately
notify the National Response Center and failure to provide timely written
follow-up reports to state and local authorities for these releases. Additionally,
PGV failed to provide state and local authorities with complete inventories of
chemicals stored on-site in 1991 and 1992.
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This section of the report is divided into three main sections: Release
Notifications, Chemical Inventory, and the PGV Emergency Response Plan.
RELEASE NOTIFICATIONS
Based on information provided in the PGV incident reports, there have
been no unreported spill releases exceeding the reportable quantity since
February 1993. An incident report is prepared when the ambient air monitors
detect H2S at greater than 25 ppb for a 6-minute average. There have been
four incident reports since February 8, 1993 [Table 1]. Neither the 25-ppb
hourly average or 10-ppb daily average permit limits were exceeded for these
four incidents. The quantity of H2S released from these incidents was
calculated, by PGV, to be less than the reportable quantity. There have been
no reported incidents since May 14, 1993.
The assumptions and calculations used to estimate the quantity of H2S
(or other reportable materials) released should be included with the incident
reports. Information used to calculate the release estimates for the four 1993
incident reports was not readily available. Calculation estimates were
recreated while on-site.
CHEMICAL INVENTORY
The 1993 Chemical Inventory Form (Tier II) was reviewed. Copies of
the inventory were provided to the State Emergency Response Commission, the
Local Emergency· Planning Committee, and the Hawaii County Fire
Department. All chemicals present at the facility, at greater than the
threshold levels, appear to be included on the Tier II submittal. The inventory
and purchase records for chemicals used on-site were compared to those
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provided on the Tier n submittals. The inventory quantities substantiate the
values submitted on the Tier II reports.
PGV maintains copies of all MSDS sheets and provides a list of these
materials to the State Emergency Response Commission, the Local Emergency
Planning Committee, and the Hawaii County Fire Department.
PGV EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
PGV is required to prepare an Emergency Response Plan (ERP) as
required by condition 26 of the Geothermal Resource Permit GRP 87-2. The
specific material to be included in the ERP is also outlined in condition 26.
The PGV Facility Emergency Response Plan (version 6.0) dated
December 1991, was reviewed by Region 9 personnel. Deficiencies potentially
impacting local residents were identified within the plan and comments were
provided to HDOH. The identified deficiencies have not been forwarded to
PGV. A revised draft copy of the PGV Facility ERP (version 6.2) was
forwarded to NEIC in early July 1995. A preliminary review of the current
draft version identified the following deficiencies:
-?
".-.
•
•
Acronyms are used extensively throughout the ERP. A list of
acronyms would be helpful for readers not familiar with certain
terms.
Conflicting information regarding well flows and H2S
concentrations is provided in Table 8.1 and Table 3 presented in
Appendix 3. Table 8.1 (Site Releases Under Routine and Upset
Conditions) assumptions include well flows of400,000 pounds per
hour and a 650-ppm H2S concentration. In Appendix H, Table 2
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• The ERP references all permits except the mc permit. Impacts
of the mc permit should be included.
• The plan does not define "incidents." The ERP outlines what
actions will occur when an incident happens. Because there is no
definition of "incident," expectations of nearby residents,
regulatory, and what constitutes an "incident" should be defined
prior to its occurrence to avoid differences in expectations
between PGV personnel, regulatory personal, and nearby
residences.
• On page 56, a reference is made to CBI which is
supposed to be a list ofwell control specialists from the mainland.
The information presented in CBI is a list of crane and
truck operators, caustic removal specialists, propane removal
specialists, gasoline/diesel fuel removal specialists, and welders!
cutters. All listed contractors are from Hawaii and it is not clear
if 24-hour access phone numbers are provided. Additionally,
there is no list of well control specialists. At minimum the well
drilling consultant should be referenced.
Reference is made to Table 8-8 on page 44. There is no Table 8-8.
This reference may be a typographical error.
•
\J
Additionally, the term "timely" communications, as referenced on
page 13, should be clarified.
• The PGV Emergency Drill discussed briefly in Chapter 7 indicates
that operations and maintenance personnel will participate. No
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mention is made as to whether local agencies or emergency
response crews will be involved.
• The phrase "Assess the conditions" referenced on page 43 IS
vague. This phrase should be clarified or perhaps deleted.
• Step 7 of the PGV General Response on page 49 states "Take
whatever follow-up appropriate actions are necessary to deal with
the facility emergency situation." This step seems somewhat
general and broad.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The following areas of concern were identified.
• The assumptions and calculations used to estimate the quantity
ofH2S released (or other reportable materials) should be included
with the incident reports. Retention of this documentation at a
central location will facilitate easier review for future incidents (if
any).
• A preliminary review of the draft Emergency Response Plan
(version 6.2) identified several deficiencies which should be
addressed. Some of these deficiencies were also pointed out in
the review of the previous version by Region 9. Generally,
plan does not provide specific information. Several t
phrases should be defined or c1arifi
misunderstandings if an incident \l
